This paper analyzes the e¤ect of globalization on wage premia by studying the interaction between trade costs, …rms' location decision, and relative demand for labor. It suggests that globalization, through vertical specialization and/or agglomeration, increases inequality in countries with a relative abundance of skilled workers in a way that is observationally equivalent to skilled-biased technological progress (i.e., joint increases in the wage premium and the within-industry skilled-unskilled employment ratio). This con…rms the potential role of international trade in explaining the observed increase in wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers that has occurred in most industrialized countries since the mid1970s. Calibration of the model supports this result. It shows that NAFTA has contributed signi…cantly to the observed increase in the U.S. wage premium.
Introduction
In the last twenty years, most OECD countries have seen a large increase in the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages (i.e., the wage premium) and/or in the share of skilled workers in employment (see Figure 1) . In Europe and North America, where economic integration is far along, the increased inequality between skilled and unskilled has further fueled the debate as to the bene…ts of integration (e.g., the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was one of the most controversial issues of the 1992 U.S. presidential campaign and has also become one of the most important arguments against the 1992 Maastrich treaty). Whereas a popular belief is that increased international trade is to a large extent responsible for the growth in inequality, economists are divided over the source of the labor demand shift. Two explanations have dominated the debate. One is that the rapid di¤usion of information technologies, computers, and new forms of work organization have biased production techniques toward skilled workers.
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The other is that increased import competition from low-wage countries has shifted resources toward industries that are relatively more skilled-intensive. The reluctance to assign trade a major role stands on two main arguments. First, most authors argue that trade volumes with low-wage countries are too small to generate the observed increase in wage inequality. Second, standard theory predicts that an increase in the relative price of skilled labor should increase the within-industry relative employment of unskilled workers.
2 But, as shown by various authors, the growth in inequality has been accompanied primarily by a within-industry shift in relative demand away from unskilled workers. Therefore, economists have generally concluded that trade must play a small role in generating the recent increase in inequality.
Most studies to date, however, have focused on trade in …nal goods. Considering trade in intermediate goods and looking at trade from a di¤erent angle than import competition may help us reconcile fact and theory. A fall in the cost of trade (e.g., lower tari¤s, transportation costs, or information/communication costs) may indeed encourage the delinking of stages of production and so lead to the development of trade in intermediate goods, components, parts, or work in progress between production units in di¤erent countries. International trade may hence become increasingly vertically specialized. 4 Because vertical specialization splits the production chain across countries, the unskilled-intensive stages within manufacturing industries shift to low-(unskilled) wage countries and consequently the wage premium and the within-industry ratio of skilled to unskilled workers rises in skilled-abundant countries. When …rms are linked through an input-output structure, globalization may also generate agglomeration-that is, the clustering of economic activity in one location. This would occur as a result of di¤erent stages of production within a given industry locating close to each other in order to take advantage of increased competitiveness and greater demand. 5 If these stages di¤er in their mix of labor factors, then agglomeration shifts the relative within-industry demand for skilled versus unskilled workers.
Under certain conditions, it also results in both an increased wage premium and an increased within-industry ratio of skilled to unskilled workers.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the e¤ect of globalization on inequality and, more speci…cally, to present a trade explanation of the observed joint increase in the wage premium and the within-industry share of skilled workers. In order to do so, I look at the interaction between trade costs, …rms' location decision, and the relative demand for labor. This paper develops a general equilibrium model that endogenously determines the equilibrium structure of production (vertical specialization or agglomeration) and wage premia. It addresses the following questions: When does vertical specialization occur? In which countries and under what conditions does agglomeration take place? How does globalization a¤ect the wage premium, in di¤erent locations? By considering trade in intermediate inputs and …rms' location decisions can we reconcile facts and theory? In the last part of the paper I evaluate, through calibration of the model, the potential impact of NAFTA in explaining the observed increased in the U.S.
wage premium.
Two bodies of literature are related to this work. The …rst one, gathered under the name of "new economic geography" studies …rms' location decision. It analyzes whether and why industrial activity tends to cluster in speci…c locations and hence provides insight concerning the e¤ects that a decrease in trade costs may have on structures of production. It also helps us understand how cross-national income gaps form and decline as trade costs vary. 6 Although recent empirical evidence (e.g., Davis and Weinstein 1998, Torstensson 1997) seem to support the relevance both of agglomeration e¤ects and of comparative advantage in a¤ecting trade and production patterns, the economic geography literature considers two symmetrical countries and hence neglects the comparative advantage channel. It also fails to provide a trade explanation of within-country increases in inequality between skilled and unskilled workers.
The second body is the profuse literature on the potential role of trade in explaining the increased inequality within industrialized countries. Closely related to the present work is Feenstra and Hanson (1996) , which use an Hecksher-Ohlin type of model and study how reallocation of production across countries (caused by exogenous reallocation of capital) a¤ects the wage premium. They point out that increased outsourcing (vertical specialization) generates withinindustry skill upgrading. In subsequent papers (e.g., Feenstra and Hanson 1996, 1997) , the authors estimate the impact of outsourcing on wages. This paper signi…cantly extends their results by studying the case of trade in di¤erentiated products and allowing for agglomeration.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out the formal model ; Section 3, the equilibrium. Sections 4-6 analyze …rms' location decision for di¤erent levels of trade costs, as well as the induced e¤ects on wage premia. Section 7 presents simulations of the model and discussions.
Section 8 calibrates the model using U.S. and Mexican data, and Section 9 concludes. (Section 10 comprises Appendices.)
The Model
I use a new economic geography model (à la Krugman and Venables 1995) in which I introduce two factors of production. This enables me to examine the location decisions of vertically linked …rms when the upstream and downstream sectors di¤er in factor intensity and countries di¤er in endowments of labor factor. Thus I analyze the e¤ect of globalization on asymmetric countries and derive conclusions regarding the wage premium. Note that, in an independent work, Amiti (2001) uses a similar framework. However, she focuses on the …rm's location pattern whereas I analyze the implication of globalization on skilled-unskilled wage inequality:
Consider two countries (home and foreign), two imperfectly competitive industries (or stages of production) that are linked through an input-output structure and an agricultural sector. 7
Firms in the upstream industry produce intermediate goods with production function
where x ui is the production of intermediate good i (the subscript u stands for upstream) and L represents unskilled labor. Firms in the downstream industry produce …nal goods with produc-tion function
where x di is the production of …nal good i (the subscript d stands for downstream), H represents skilled labor, and C u represents a composite good made up of varieties of upstream (intermediate) goods, as will be seen later in the model.
8
As is standard in trade models labor is assumed to be immobile across countries, the home and foreign countries face the same technology, and consumers in home and foreign have identical homothetic preferences over a composite good made up of varieties of downstream (…nal) goods and an agricultural good. The assumption of homotheticity permits separation of the consumption decision into two stages: (i) the allocation of expenditure between the agricultural good and manufactured goods, and (ii) suballocation of manufaturing expenditure among varieties. The agricultural good is assumed to be freely tradeable and its price is used as numeraire.
There is trade in both intermediate and …nal goods. I also make the assumptions
where ¹ H is the endowment in skilled labor, ¹ L is the endowment in unskilled labor, and variables with a * superscript correspond to foreign variables. These assumptions are speci…c to this model.
Within this framework, three forces in ‡uence a …rm's production location choice: vertical (cost and demand) linkages, factor prices, and access to market. if strong enough they give rise to agglomeration of the industrial production in one location.
On the other hand, two considerations play against agglomeration: immobility of …nal demand;
and di¤erences in indowments (and hence prices) of labor factors. Whether agglomeration or vertical specialization takes place depends on the relative magnitudes of these forces, which in turn depend on the level of trade costs.
Next I specify the equations of the model for the home country. Symmetric equations hold for the foreign country.
Preferences
Consumers have Cobb-Douglas preferences over the agricultural good and the manufactured good. Their utility is
where C A is the demand for agricultural good (with price used as numeraire; i.e., p A = 1): Here 
; where c di is the demand in the home country for downstream good i produced domestically and m dj is the home demand for downstream good j produced abroad ; n d (resp., n ¤ d ) is the number of downstream …rms located in the home (resp., foreign) country. We refer to C d as the aggregate downstream good.
Shipment of the manufactured goods incurs \iceberg" trade costs. That is, in order to deliver one unit of any good from one country to another, ¿ > 1 units must be shipped because only a fraction 1/¿ arrives; 1-1=¿ melts in transit. The manufacturing price index of the aggregate downstream good, P d ; is hence de…ned by
; where p di is the producer price of downstream good i:
Agriculture
The agricultural sector is perfectly competitive and produces an homogenous good, x A , that is assumed to be costlessly tradeable. Since the agricultural good's price is the same in both countries, I choose it as numeraire. Note that x A is produced using unskilled labor and arable land, R; with constant returns to scale. Here R is a speci…c factor used only in the x A industry ; it acts partly to "convexify" the model. As the manufactured sector expands, it draws unskilled labor from the agricultural sector. This raises the R=L A ratio and thereby the cost of unskilled labor measured in terms of x A . Since the purpose of this paper is to study …rms' location decisions when countries di¤er in labor endowments and the resulting skilled-unskilled inequality, I assume that countries are otherwise similar and hence that R = R ¤ : The production function is assumed to take a Cobb-Douglas form so that
where L A denotes agricultural employment.
Firms
The manufacturing sector is monopolistically competitive (à la Dixit and Stiglitz 1977) and is composed of two industries or stages that are vertically linked through an input-output structure. At each stage, di¤erentiated goods are produced under increasing returns to scale.
Following Dixit and Stiglitz, we assume that production of a quantity x hi of any variety i in any stage h requires the same …xed (®) and variable (¯x hi ) quantities of inputs.
The upstream industry uses only unskilled labor, L, as input. Therefore,
Then an upstream …rm, producing quantity x ui of variety i; has a total cost function of
where w L denotes the price of unskilled labor.
Downstream …rms feature a production function de…ned over skilled labor, H, and a composite good C u made up of varieties of upstream goods. Following Ethier (1982) , upstream goods contribute in a symmetric fashion to the production of a downstream good with a constant elasticity of substitution ¾ > 1 across varieties. C u is de…ned by
; where c ui is the demand (summed over all domestic downstream …rms) for upstream good i produced domestically and m uj is the total home demand for upstream good j produced abroad;
n u (resp., n ¤ u ) is the number of upstream …rms located in the home (resp., foreign) country. We will refer to C u as the aggregate upstream good. The input used by the downstream industry is a Cobb-Douglas composite of (a) skilled labor H with share 1 ¡ ¹ and (b) the aggregate upstream good C u with share ¹. We thus have
The share ¹ of the intermediate input in production is a key parameter because it represents the vertical linkages between the two sectors. The higher is ¹; the more upstream goods are used in production of a downstream good and hence the stronger are forces that in ‡uence downstream and upstream …rms to locate close to each other.
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The manufacturing price index of the aggregate upstream good, P u ; is de…ned by:
; where p ui is the producer price of upstream good i. Therefore, a downstream …rm producing quantity x di of variety i has a total cost function of
where w H denotes the price of skilled labor.
I assume that there is free entry and exit at both stages. With a large number of symmetric …rms in each stage, in equilibrium each …rm's pro…t is driven to zero.
Solving for the Equilibrium
I solve for the equilibrium by considering the optimization problems of the consumers, downstream …rms, and upstream …rms in turn and then clearing the product and labor markets. First, I compute consumers' demand for …nal goods. Second, solving for the upstream and downstream …rms, pro…t maximization, I obtain producers' prices as well as their demand for labor and for intermediate inputs. Then, using the condition of free entry and exit, I derive the output required for each …rm to break even. Finally, after clearing markets, I derive the equilibrium conditions that simultaneously yield, for each country, the number of …rms in each stage and the associated equilibrium of skilled and unskilled wages.
Consumer Demand for Final Goods
Consumers maximize utility subject to their budget constraints. Given homothetic preferences, this problem is equivalent to maximizing a representative consumer's utility where the consumer's income, I, is the sum of labor income and landowner income within a country.
Using Roy's identity on the indirect utility function V = P ¡°d I and recalling that the price of the agricultural good equals unity, we obtain c di , the consumer demand for …nal good i produced at home, as well as m dj , the consumer demand for …nal good j produced abroad:
Agricultural Sector Demand for Factors
In the agricultural sector, producers choose L A and R that maximize pro…t. Since the sector is perfectly competitive, the pro…t is zero. Landowners receive positive returns de…ned by rR, where r is the price of land: Using (2:2), and normalizing R to 1, the …rst-order conditions are:
Downstream Price, Quantity, and Factor Demand
A downstream …rm i chooses a quantity x di to maximize its pro…t, taking other …rms, quantities as given. Each …rm produces a distinct variety, since a …rm always does better by introducing a new product variety than by sharing in the production of an existing one. The …rst-order condition equating marginal revenue to marginal cost yields
( 3.5) so that the price is a constant mark-up over marginal cost. (To derive this result, note that the price elasticity of demand is equal to the consumer elasticity of substitution between varieties).
Because each …rm has the same technology, all downstream …rms within a country set the same price and so the i subscript can be dropped. Substituting the pro…t-maximizing price back into the pro…t equation yields
The demand for each variety depends negatively on the number of varieties produced (the more varieties, the lower the index price and therefore the smaller the demand for each variety). Hence, in equilibrium the number of varieties produced is such that each …rm breaks even. Using the condition of free entry and exit and setting pro…t equal to zero determines the quantity of output at which a …rm breaks even:
The equilibrium quantity produced is constant and is independent of its price, factor prices, and the number of …rms. It is the same across …rms, so the i subscript can be dropped. This is a well-known consequence of Dixit-Stiglitz preferences and constant elasticity of substitution.
The downstream …rm's demand for labor and intermediate goods is obtained by cost minimization. Using Shephard's lemma, we obtain a downstream …rm's demand for upstream goods produced at home and abroad and for skilled labor. Then, imposing the zero-pro…t condition yields the total demand by downstream …rms for upstream good i produced at home for upstream good j produced abroad, and for skilled labor H; as follows:
Upstream Price, Quantity, and Factor Demand
Upstream …rms face the same optimization problem as downstream …rms. The upstream …rm i chooses x ui to maximize its pro…t, implying that
In equilibrium, free entry and exit yield
The maximizing price and the equilibrium quantity produced are constant and the same across …rms, so the i subscript can be dropped.
Upstream …rms choose unskilled labor to minimize cost. Total home demand for unskilled labor, L; is
Market-Clearing Conditions
Product market equilibrium requires demand to equal supply for each good in each manufacturing industry and for the agricultural good. For simplicity, as traditional in the literature, units of measurement are chosen such that¯= ®(¾ ¡ 1). This implies
Moreover,
Labor market equilibrium requires that demand equal supply for each type of labor:
The General Equilibrium
Using the products and factors market conditions and the free-entry and market-clearing conditions for home and foreign, we can solve for the equilibrium number of …rms, wages, and prices.
For each value of trade costs ¿; there is an equilibrium level of 
The Autarkic Equilibrium
If trade costs are in…nite then countries do not trade; this is the autarkic equilibrium. At high but …nite trade costs, there is some trade but it is highly expensive to ship intermediate and …nal goods from one country to the other and hence there is a positive number of both upstream and downstream …rms in each country. This is the quasi-autarkic situation. I …rst show that the autarkic equilibrium exists. Since autarky will be used as benchmark in the rest of the paper, I
then compute the relative number of …rms and wage premia for autarkic equilibrium.
Proposition 4.1. As ¿ tends to in…nity; autarky is the unique equlibrium.
Proof. Note that, for ¿ ! 1; the price of a foreign good ¿p h (h = d; u:) becomes in…nite.
Thus, countries no longer trade and we have
In equilibrium, the quantity produced is constant and similar across varieties. Given the production functions, this implies that each …rm of the same type (upstream or downstream) uses a constant and similar quantity of input. As a result, the quantity of unskilled labor employed in the upstream sector in equilibrium is L = n u L i = n u ®¾. Similarly, the equilibrium quantity of skilled labor employed in the downstream sector is
Also, in autarky,
Using these expressions and their foreign equivalents yields the relative number (home to foreign) of upstream and downstream …rms in autarkic equilibrium:
Now, applying the equilibrium condition that wage equals marginal productivity of labor in both the agricultural and the downstream goods sectors, using the autarkic expressions for relative downstream price, and then substituting, I obtain the equilibrium relative wages:
Proposition 4.2. The share of unskilled labor endowment used in agriculture is the same in both the home country and the foreign country. That is,
Proof. . See Appendix 1.
Using Proposition 4.2 and the skilled labor market-clearing condition (i.e., ¹
yields the autarkic equilibrium relative wages and numbers of …rms in term of relative labor endowments:
In autarkic equilibrium, relative-factors prices mirror relative-factors endowments. The unskilled wage is higher in the home country whereas the skilled wage is higher in the foreign country and hence the foreign country is more unequal (i.e., has a higher wage premium, re-
The relative number of upstream …rms corresponds to the relative unskilled labor endowment. More upstream …rms locate where unskilled labor is more abundant-that is, where it is cheaper. The autarkic relative number of downstream …rms depends on (a) the relative skilled labor endowment (up to the share at which skilled labor enters …nal goods' production) and on (b) the relative unskilled labor endowment (up to the share at which unskilled labor-through the relative price of intermediate goods-enters …nal goods' production). Note that the ratio of home to foreign downstream …rms is increasing in relative skilled labor endowment (or in relative skilled wage) and decreasing in relative unskilled labor endowment (or in relative intermediate goods price).
The Vertical Specialization Equilibrium: Low Trade Costs
At low trade costs, access to market (i.e., being close to the demand for …nal goods) and vertical linkages in ‡uence only partially the …rm's location decision. The price of the immobile factors is the force that matters. Because downstream and upstream …rms di¤er with respect to intensify of labor factors, stages of production tend to locate in di¤erent countries; that is vertical specialization occurs. Variations in the number of …rms shift labor demand and hence modify wages. In equilibrium, wages are such that a marginal …rm does not …nd it pro…table to relocate. It is interesting, that, in the home country, the wage premium and the within- 
If trade incurs no costs, then demand-side considerations do not in ‡uence …rms' location decisions. Firms …nd it pro…table to locate where their production costs are lowest. Since the foreign country has abundant unskilled labor, its autarkic unskilled wage is relatively lower.
Thus, with free trade, upstream …rms have an incentive to locate in the foreign country.
Proposition 5.1. In an interior equilibrium, the relative number of upstream …rms (home to foreign) is lower under free trade than under autarky, i.e.; N u < N a u :
Proof. In an interior equilibrium (in which there is production of upstream and downstream goods in both countries), at ¿ = 1; it must be true that w L = w ¤ L ; for if not then at least one upstream …rm would …nd it pro…table to relocate. By assumption, R = R ¤ and thus the marginal productivity of labor is the same in the home country as in the foreign country. This implies that the same number of unskilled workers is employed in the agricultural sector in both countries
Recalling that ¹ L ¤ > ¹ L; the proposition follows.
Similarly, since the home country has abundant skilled labor, its autarkic skilled wage is relatively lower. Since upstream goods are shipped at no cost, under free trade the downstream …rms have an incentive to locate in the home country.
Proposition 5.2. In an interior equilibrium, the relative number of downstream …rms (home to foreign) is higher under free trade, than under autarky ; i.e.,
Proof. In an interior equilibrium, it must be true that downstream …rms' production costs at ¿ = 1; are equal across countries; if this were not the case then at least one downstream …rm would …nd it pro…table to relocate. Downstream …rms use skilled labor and intermediate goods as factors of production. Free trade guarantees that the price of the upstream good is the same in both locations, which implies that w H = w ¤ H : The skilled labor demand equation
Free trade likewise guarantees that the price of the downstream good is the same in both locations and so, under free trade,
Thus, relatively more upstream (downstream) …rms locate in the foreign (home) country under free trade than under autarky. The foreign country specializes in the production of upstream goods whereas the home country specializes in the production of downstream goods. Di¤erent stages of the production process locate in di¤erent countries, so there is vertical specialization.
Owing to specialization and gain from trade, the number of downstream …rms in the home country is higher under free trade than under autarky. Simulations of the model con…rm that the contrary is true of the number of upstream …rms. 12 Changes in the number of …rms translate to wages and, as a result, the home wage premium is higher under vertical specialization than under autarky. Proposition 5.3 shows that, in the home country, the within-industry skilled-unskilled employment ratio is also higher under free trade than under autarky. Proof.
There is full employment of skilled labor in the downstream sector. Hence, Whereas empirical evidence supports this co-movement, it is at odds with a Stolper-Samuelson type of explanation of the increase in skilled-unskilled worker inequality (as mentioned earlier, traditional trade theory posits that the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers decreases within industry). Most studies to date have therefore concluded that international trade plays a limited role in explaining the increased inequality and have argued for skilled-biased technological progress as the most likely culprit. However, under vertical specialization, labor demand shifts along the production chain in a way that is observationally equivalent to a labor shift induced by skilled-biased technological changes. The "vertical specialization" story thus provides an alternative explanation for the joint occurrence of the wage premium increase and the within-industry share of skilled workers increase. Hence international trade, through vertical specialization, may be an important cause of the increased inequality observed in most industrialized countries.
In the foreign country, the wage premium is lower under free trade than under autarky. This result, although in line with standard Hecksher-Ohlin theory, is counterfactual in that most developing countries undergo an increase in wage inequality. 14 Note, however, that the present paper does not aim to provide an explanation for all wage premium variations in all countries but rather to explain part of the increase in wage premium in countries with abundant skilled labor.
Skilled-biased technological progress, which undoubtedly plays a role in explaining increased wage premia, may have a dominant e¤ect in developing countries or in those with an abundance of unskilled labor. In fact, in developing countries, skilled-biased technological progress may result from trade with, foreign direct investment in, and transnational …rms relocating from industrialized countries. Discussing such arguments is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.
Next, we analyze an equilibrium characterized by low trade costs. Let ª a L denote the autarkic equilibrium relative unskilled wage.
Proposition 5.4. For any trade-cost levels such that ª a L > ¿; upstream …rms have an incentive to locate in the foreign country.
Proof. Upstream …rms decide to locate in the foreign country if the potential pro…t of a single …rm is higher in the foreign country than in the home country-that is, if
single upstream …rm located in the home country produces a quantity x u = x ho u + x fo u . It sells a quantity x ho u in the home country at price p u and a quantity x fo u =¿ in the foreign country at price ¿p u : Its cost of production is (x ho u + x fo u )w L . If the upstream …rm were to locate in the foreign country, it could always chose to sell the same quantities at the same price and thus generate the same revenue. In order to sell x ho u units of the good in the home country, an upstream …rm located in the foreign country must produce a quantity ¿x ho u . Its cost of production is
L always holds; a su¢cient condition for the cost to be higher in the home country than in the foreign country (and hence for
The proposition follows.
Similarly, suppose that ª a H and ¦ a characterize, respectively, the autarkic equilibrium relative skilled wage and the relative intermediate goods price.
Proposition 5.5. For any trade-cost levels such that (ª a H ) ¹¡1 (¦ a ) ¡¹ > ¿; downstream …rms have an incentive to locate in the home country.
Proof. Using an argument similar to the previous one, it follows that
A su¢cient condition for the cost to be higher in the foreign than in the home country is that
The proposition follows. That is, wages converge across countries, and both the wage premium and the within-industry share of skilled workers rise in the home country compared to their autarkic levels.
The Agglomeration Equilibrium: Intermediate Trade Costs
At Downstream …rms decide to locate in the foreign country if the potential pro…t of a single …rm is higher in the foreign country than in the home country. Using an argument similar to that used in the preceding case,
e., at the highest relative upstream goods price; see Proposition 6.1; the inequality
¡¹ < ¿ is a necessary condition for any one downstream …rm to wish to locate in the foreign country.
¡¹ is decreasing in ¹, it follows that, the higher the share of intermediate goods used in …nal goods production (i.e., the stronger the linkages between …rms), the less restrictive the necessary condition. Note that, if a downstream …rm …nds an incentive to locate in the foreign country, then it must be true that the cost linkage is stronger than the factor price force.
Proposition 6.2. If the necessary condition for a single downstream …rm to locate in the foreign country holds, then the cost linkage is stronger than the factor price force.
Proof. The necessary condition for
the necessary condition holds. It is equivalent to
The relative price of the intermediate goods (up to the share at which intermediate goods enter …nal goods production) is greater than the relative skilled wage (up to the share at which skilled labor enters …nal goods production):
Three conditions make inequality (6.1) more likely to hold: strong vertical linkages (i.e., high ¹); high relative unskilled endowment, because it reinforce the cost linkage; and low relative skilled endowment, because it lessens the forces of factor prices. 
, agglomeration in the home country is likely to occur.
Simulations and Discussion
Simulations of the model are plotted in Figures 1 and Figure 2 . The …gures sketch the relationship between the share of …rms in home (i.e., the ratio of the number of type-h …rms locating in the home country to the total number of type-h …rms, where h = upstream or downstream) and the level of trade costs. They provide an overview of the equilibrium structures of production and wages as trade costs vary. In Figure 2 , countries di¤er in their unskilled labor endowment whereas in Figure 3 , they di¤er in their skilled labor endowment. 18 Note that in the presented simulations, small di¤erences in labor endowments are considered. Larger di¤erences would obviously enhance agglomeration and vertical specialization.
Simulations con…rm the results discussed in previous sections. At high levels of trade costs, both countries produce both goods and the share of …rms in each country does not vary much.
This is the quasi-autarkic situation. For a range of intermediate trade costs, the share of both types of …rms increases in one country compared to their autarkic levels: an agglomeration process takes place. If countries di¤er in unskilled labor endowments, the industrial activity clusters in the foreign country Figure 2 In the (home) country with abundant skilled labor, the wage premium is higher under vertical specialization than under any other situation ( i.e., autarky or agglomeration). Furthermore, the number of home-country upstream …rms is lower under vertical specialization than under autarky. Vertical specialization induces a within-industry shift away from unskilled workers, which occurs whereas the wage premium increases. Hence, in empirical studies, this potential cause of within-industry increase in inequality should be carefully disentangled from the observationally equivalent counterpart, skilled-biased technological progress.
Consequences of agglomeration on wage premia are more complex. Because the skilled labor endowment is fully used in the downstream sector, factor market competition is …ercer in this sector than in the upstream one. Hence, the impact of a change in the number of downstream …rms on skilled wages tends to be greater than the impact of a change in the number of up-stream …rms on unskilled wage. Also, …rms that relocate against their comparative advantage do so in smaller numbers. If the agglomeration takes place in the home country, then relocation of downstream …rms is driven by the cost linkage and by di¤erences in relative factor prices (caused by the di¤erence between countries in relative endowments); however relocation of upstream …rms is driven by the demand linkage but contraindicated by di¤erences in relative factor prices. In equilibrium, proportionally more downstream …rms than upstream …rms relocate their production from the foreign country to the home country. Undoubtedly, then, changes in skilled wages dominate changes in unskilled wages. Home relative wages are more unequal under agglomeration than under autarky whereas foreign relative wages are more equal. This situation is depicted in Figure 3 (b) . If the agglomeration takes place in the foreign country the-even though upstream …rms relocate in greater proportion than downstream …rms-skilled wages seem to be more a¤ected than unskilled wages by the change in relative demand for labor.
The wage premium increases in the foreign country and decreases in the home country compared to autarkic levels (see Figure 2 Assuming that NAFTA eliminates tari¤s and NTBs and that freight costs decrease by half, trade costs fall from 43% to 10% over the period. 23 I therefore investigate the impact of a 33% decrease in trade cost on the wage premium. For the sake of robustness, I also consider a smaller decrease in trade costs: assuming that freight costs do not fall and that there are still some tari¤s and NTBs, trade costs decrease by about 20%. Calibration of the model shows that such decreases in trade costs induce an increase in the skilled-abundant country's wage premium of 5% and 3.2%, respectively. As mentioned previously, the U.S. wage premium-calculated as the ratio of average annual wage of college to high-school graduates-rose by about 15% in the 1980s (see Bound and Johnson 1992) . Harrigan (1998) , using a similar measure of relative wage,
shows that the increasing trend in the U.S. relative wage persisted over the 1990-1995 period.
He …nds that the U.S. wage premium rose by about 8% between 1990 and 1995. Since there is some evidence that the increase in wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers lessens at the end of the considered decade, I assume that the wage premium increases by 10%-15% in the 1990s.
Thus, a 33% (20%) decrease in trade costs would explain 35% (22%) of a 15% increase in the U.S. wage premium; it would explain 52% (33%) of a 10% increase in the U.S. wage premium. 24 The high level of these contributions is partly explained by the extreme structure of the model (i.e., the fact that sectors are labor-speci…c). However, these results con…rm the positive and signi…cant impact of trade, through vertical specialization, in explaining the increase in the wage premium of relatively skilled-abundant countries. Because it increased vertical specialization across countries, NAFTA has indeed contributed to the observed increase in skilled-unskilled worker inequality in the United States.
Conclusion
This paper provides a theoretical contribution to the analysis of the …rm's location and its impact on labor prices. The main result establishes that if …rms are vertically linked and if stages of production di¤er in labor factor intensity, then a decrease in trade cost implies the joint occurrence of increased wage premium and within-industry skilled-unskilled ratio in skilledabundant countries. There is strong empirical evidence of this co-movement, yet traditional trade theory o¤ers no explanation. By considering trade in intermediate goods as well as relocation of …rms, this paper helps to reconcile facts and theory.
The vertical structure of production presented here corresponds more appropriately to some sectors of the economy than others. It would therefore be interesting to identify these other sectors, to investigate whether reallocation of stages of production across countries has occurred in them and to estimate the e¤ects of relocation on within-industry relative employment levels and wages. Empirical work is in progress that aims to answer these questions by analyzing the case of France. this implies that
Similarly, in the foreign country we have
. Supply of the agricultural good is such that x A = L ± A at home and x ¤ A = L ¤± A (recall that, by assumption, R = R ¤ and R is normalized to 1). The
In equilibrium, the price and marginal productivity of factors are equal, so
Substituting in (10.1) and then rearranging yields
This equality holds if and only if at least one of the following three conditions is true.
Solving yields L A =L ¤ A > ¹ L= ¹ L ¤ which contradicts the …rst inequality (c).
Thus, condition (i) must be true. Hence
Appendix 2
Proof of proposition 6.1 (continued). @g = (@g=@N u )@N u + (@g=@W)(@W=@N u )@N u ; 2 Hecksher-Ohlin theory (and more speci…cally the Stolper-Samuelson theorem) predicts that trade with lowwage countries raises the relative price of the skilled-intensive good. It implies an increase in the relative price of skilled labor and consequently an increase in the ratio of unskilled to skilled workers within industries.
3 Berman et al. (1994) and Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) for the U.S.; Machin et al. (1996) for the U.K., Sweden, and Denmark; and Strauss-Kahn (2001) for France.
4 Feenstra (1998), Campa and Goldberg (1997) , Hummels et al. (1998 Hummels et al. ( , 1999 , and Strauss-Kahn (2001) document that vertical specialization has increased.
5 These stages refer either to di¤erent links of the production chain (e.g., the production of tires, engines, and electronic components in the automobile industry) or to di¤erent varieties at a similar stage of production (e.g., the production of di¤erent kinds of tires in the automobile industry).
10 See equations (2.3) and (2.4) and recall that¯= ®(¾ ¡ 1):
11 Cui is the aggregate of di¤erentiated upstream goods demanded by downstream …rm i. In equilibrium, pu is constant over varieties. A representative downstream …rm therefore demands the same quantity of each variety k. 12 A scenario in which the number of upstream …rms increases in both the home and the foreign country (though it rises in greater proportion in the latter) is a potential free-trade equilibrium. This would occur if total demand for upstream goods increases dramatically from its autarkic to its free-trade level. However, simulations of the model rule out such possibilities, and this is true for a full range of parameters and endowment levels.
Hence in autarky
13 Although the proof is tied up to the sector-speci…c structure of the model, the proposition holds in a more general framework. Suppose that both downstream and upstream …rms use both types of labor, with downstream …rms being skilled-labor-intensive and upstream …rms being unskilled-labor-intensive. If the number of home upstream …rms is lower under free trade than under autarky, then the within-industry skilled-unskilled employment ratio is higher under vertical specializatin than under autarky .
14 The Hecksher-Ohlin factor price equalization theorem posits that relative factor prices should converge across countries (i.e., the wage premium should increase in the skilled-abundant country and decrease in the unskilledabundant country). 
